We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen's one by the replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well.
Introduction
We consider the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure that can be regarded as an expansion of the Shapley value for the situation when a coalition structure is involved. The Owen value was introduced in Owen (1977) via a set of axioms it determining. These axioms were vastly inspired by original Shapley's axiomatization that in turn exploits the additivity axiom. However, the additivity axiom that being a very beautiful mathematical statement does not express any fairness property. Another axiomatization of the Shapley value proposed by Young (1985) via marginality, efficiency, and symmetry appears to be more attractive since all the axioms present different reasonable properties of fair division. The goal of this paper is to evolve Young's approach to the case of the Owen value for games with coalition structure. We provide a new axiomatization for the Owen value without the additivity axiom that is obtained from the original Owen's one by the replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the similar axiomatization can also be obtained for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter (1989) for games with level structure.
Section 2 introduces basic definitions and notation. In Sect. 3, we present an axiomatization for the Owen value for games with coalition structure and for Winter's generalization for games with level structure on the basis of the marginality axiom.
Definitions and notation
First recall some definitions and notation. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair N , v , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2 N ) of s players is called a coalition, and the associated real number v(S) presents the worth of the coalition S. For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of N , v when refer to a game, and also omit the braces when writing one-player coalitions such as {i}. The set of all games with a fixed player set N we denote G N . For any set of games G ⊆ G N , a value on G is a mapping ψ : G → R n that associates with each game v ∈ G a vector ψ(v) ∈ R n , where the real number ψ i (v) represents the payoff to the player i in the game v.
We consider games with coalition structure. A coalition structure B = {B 1 , . . . , B m } on a player set N is a partition of the player set N , i.e., B 1 ∪ · · · ∪ B m = N and B i ∩ B j = ∅ for i = j. Denote by B N a set of all coalition structures on N . In this context a value is an operator that assigns a vector of payoffs to any pair (v, B) of a game and a coalition structure on N . More precisely, for any set of games G ⊆ G N and any set of coalition structures B ⊆ B N , a coalitional value on G with a coalition structure from B is a mapping ξ : G × B → R n that associates with each pair v, B of a game v ∈ G and a coalition structure B ∈ B a vector ξ(v, B) ∈ R n , where the real number ξ i (v, B) represents the payoff to the player i in the game v with the coalition structure B.
We say players i, j ∈ N are symmetric with respect to the game v ∈ G if they make the same marginal contribution to any coalition non-containing them, i.e., for any S ⊆ N \{i, j}, v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j). A player i is a null-player in the game v ∈ G if he adds nothing to any coalition non-containing him, i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S), for every S ⊆ N \i.
In what follows we denote the cardinality of any set A by |A|. 
